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ABSTRACT
This paper derives methods for the calculation of optimal
stabilization policies under the assumption that monetary and
fiscal control are exercised by separate authorities who may have
different objectives. Each authority minimizes its own quadratic
cost functional subject to the constraint of a linear econometric
model. Nash solution strategies are calculated for this discrete-
time differential game, both in the context of open-loop and closed-
loop behavior (in the closed-loop framework each authority can con-
tinually revise his policy in response to the evolving stragegy of
the other authority). The results are applied to a small econometric
model, and show how the degree of fiscal or monetary control depends
on the particular conflict situation, and how conflicting policies
are "sub-optimal" in comparison with coordinated policies.
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1Optimal Stabilization Policies Under Decentralized Control
and Conflicting Objectives
1. Introduction
There have recently appeared several applications of optimal control
theory to economic stabilization policy which involve the calculation of
time paths ("trajectories") for one or more policy variables in order to
minimize some macroeconomic cost functional. These studies have attempted.
to show how policy variables such as the level of government expenditures,
one or more tax rates, an: the money stock cat e manipulated in order to
best attain objectives relating to GNP, employment, prices, etc. Previous
work by this author [18, 19, 20] demonstrated how optimal policies could be
calculated in a deterministic framework using a linear (or linearized) econo-
metric model and a quadratic cost functional which penalized for deviations
of target variables and policy variables from a set of nominal (i.e. "ideal")
paths. Others have generalized the problem by allowing the objective function
to be piece-wise quadratic [10, 11], by allowing the model to be non-linear
[4, 9, 14, 16], or by working in a stochastic framework in which the model
contained additive error terms and/or random coefficients [4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15].
All of these studies have been based on the assumption that there is a
single authority (or "controller") making and implementing policy based on
a single set of objectives. Macroeconomic policy in the United States,
however, is the product of a decentralized control process in which different
authorities control different sets of policy instruments. The most obvious
example of decentralization in this country is the separation of monetary
and fiscal policy.l The formulation ind execution of monetary policy is in
1 - Fiscal policy is itself decentralized to some extent. Tax schedules,
transfer schedules, and trade tariffs and quotas may, for example, be
controlled, or at least influenced, to a greater or lesser extent by
different Congressional committees and by the President.
.- ,,
2the domain of the Federal Reserve System, and is largely independent of the
formulation of fiscal policy and the control of fiscal instruments. In the
past two or three decades monetary and fiscal policy have not always been
coordinated and based on the same objectives. There have been periods in
which the objectives differed, and there have been periods in which the
objectives were the same but the world views on which policies are based
differed. It is not clear what influence this has had in the past on our
overall ability to control the economy, but some people have argued that
the economy could be controlled more easily and effectively if monetary
and fiscal policy were better coordinated or even put in the hands of a
single authority.
From the point of view of optimal control, there is reason to believe
that the separation of monetary and fiscal policy may be important in
limiting our ability to stabilize the economy. Monetary policy operates
with long lags and fiscal policy with short lags, and as a result the
proper phasing of the two is critical. We have seen from optimal stabi-
lization policies calculated under the assumption of centralized control
that the relative timing of monetary and fiscal expansion is just as im-
2
portant as the relative amounts of expansion. Thus monetary and fiscal
policies that are not well coordinated may turn out to be very sub-optimal.
And monetary and fiscal policies designed with different objectives in
mind may, because of the difference in lag time, result in economic per-
formance that is far from either objective.
our objective is to calculate optimal stabilization policies under
the assumption that monetary and fiscal control are exercised by different
authorities. Before we do this, however, we must start with a model for
the decentralized control process, i.e. a description of how and why the
2 - See, for example, Pindyck [19], Chapter 6.
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3two authorities w arrive at policies different from those that would
result in the cen .ized case. We could consider the following deter-
ministic possibilities:
(1) Each authority arrives at its policy using the same econometric
model (i.e. each has the same view of the way the world works),
but has a different set of objectives.
(2) The two authorities have the same set of objectives, but each
exercises control based on policies arrived at using a different
econometric model.
(3) The two authorities have the same set of objectives and use the
same econometric model, but each has a different set of informa-
tion available to it. Each, for example, might receive data on
different variables at different times.
(4) A combination of (1), (2), and (3), i.e. each authority has a
different set of objectives, a different econometric model, and
a different set of information.
In this paper we will concentrate only on the decentralized control
process represented by (1) above. This process, besides being representa-
tive of at least part of the reason for the occasional lack of coordination
of monetary and fiscal policy, can be viewed as a non-zero sum differential
game (in discrete time), and the associated mathematics should therefore
3
be reasonably tractable. The process represented by (2) may also be repre-
sentative of the real world, but unfortunately this author knows of no game
theory (or other theory) that he can turn to for guidance in finding a
solution. The process represented by (3) is interesting, but also difficult
to analyze. This process falls under the rubric of team theory, and although
static team theory has been fairly well developed, a dynamic theory of teams
is almost nonexistent.4 Finally, the process represented by (4), like (2)
and (3), will be left for others to grapple with.
-3 or an overview of differential game theory, see Ho 2].
4 - ee, for example, Marschak and Radner [17], and Ho and Chu 13].
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4Process (1) can be divided into two alternative modes of behavior:
(a) Each authority designs its optimal policy (based on its own ob-
jectives) at the beginning of the planning period, and then
sticks to that policy throughout the entire planning period.
This is called an open-loop strategy.
(b) Each authority designs a control rule at the beginning of the
planning period, and then uses that control rule, together with
observations of the state of the economy, to continuously re-
vise his policy. This is called a closed-loop strategy, but
should not be confused with the notion of a closed-loop optimal
control as in the centralized case. We are viewing the
economy as decentralized but deterministic. so that the closed-
loop strategy allows adaptation not to the impact of random
shocks, but to the evolving strategy of the other authority.
In this paper we will obtain both open-loop and closed-loop optimal
strategies for a deterministic linear economy in which the controls are
decentralized. Solution algorithms will be derived under the assump-
tion that the monetary and fiscal authorities each attempt to minimize
their own individual quadratic cost functionals. By applying the solu-
tions to a small econometric model, we will try to gain some insight
into what kinds of policies and economic behavior result when the two
authorities attach different relative costs to different macroeconomic
objectives. We will also examine how different these policies (and
their economic implications) are from-those that would result under an
optimal centralized control. We hope to learn, for example, whether
small differences in objectives result in large differences in policy.
52. Formulation of the Problem
We begin with a linear econometric model represented in state-variable
form:5
x+ 1 - Xt Axt + Bul + Bu2t + Ct (1)
with initial condition x = 5. Here xt is a vector of n state variables,
Ult and u2t are vectors of r and r2 control (policy) variables, each of
which can be manipulated by a different authority (presumable monetary
and fiscal), and z is a vector of s uncontrollable exogenous variables
whose present and future values are known or can be predicted. A, B1, B2,
and C are n x n, n x rl, n x r2, and n x s matrices respectively.
Each authority must choose an optimal trajectory (which we call a
"strategy") for its own set of control variables over the time period
t = 0,1,...,N-1. These controls, together with the trajectory for the
exogeneous variables zt and the initial state x determine the trajectory
for the state variables over the time t = 1,2,...,N. The first authority
chooses its strategy {ult} to minimize its cost functional:
N-1
1 1 )
1 2' (XNlN) Q1(XNXN). + 2 Z {(xt-xlt) 'Ql(x lt)t=0
+ (Ult-ult)'Rl(Ult-ult) + (u2t 2t)'R12 (u2t-u2t ) (2)
The second authority chooses its strategy {u2t} to minimize its cost func-
tional:
N-11 1 N^ 
J2 = 2 (XN-X2N)'Q2(XN-X2N) + 2 {(xt- 2 t)'Q 2(xt-x 2t)t=0
+ (Ult-Ult) R2 1(Ult-u1 t) + (u2t-u2t) 'R22 (u2t-u2t (3)
5 - For an introduction to the state-variable form of an econometric model,
see Pindyck [19], Chapter 5 and the Appendix.
6Here xlt and x2t represent nominal (desired) values for the state vari-
ables from the points of view of authorities 1 and 2 respectively, and simi-
larly ult and 2t represent nominal values of the control variables for each
authority. The matrices Q1 and Q2 represent, for authorities 1 and 2
respectively, the relative weights assigned to deviations from the nominal
paths for each state variable, and Rll and R22 designate the relative weights
that each authority assigns to deviations from the nominal path for its own
control variables. R12 and R21 designate the relative weights that each
authority assigns to deviations from the nominal path for the other author-
ity's control variables; a non-zero element in one of these matrices might
indicate, for example, that the monetary authority considers it somewhat
important that the fiscal authority keep government spending close to the
target path for government spending specified by the fiscal authority. Thus
these matrices indicate how important it is for each authority that the other
authority stay close to its policy variable targets. As one would expect,
these matrices are relevant only to the closed-loop strategies, where each
authority must continually revise its own policy in response to policy
changes by the other authority. If R12 is large (relative to Q1 and R)
then authority 1 will design its strategy so as to force authority 2 to keep
its policy variables close to their nominal paths. This has no relevance,'
of course, to an open-loop control strategy (where neither authority can in-
fluence the policy of the other), and. as we will see R12 and R21 do not ap-
pear in the open-loop solution.
Some restrictions must be placed on the matrices Q1 Q2 Rll, and R22.
We will assume that Q1 and Q2 are positive semi-definite, and that Rll and
R22 are positive definite. We put no restrictions on R12 and R21. For most
economic problems all of these matrices will be diagonal, although it is
not essential that this be the case.
III
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The problem as stated above is essentially a discrete-time differential
game. On the following pages we will find, for both the open-loop and closed-
loop cases, Nash solutions to this problem. The Nash solutions (u*,u*) are
defined as satisfying the conditions
Jl(u*,u*) < Jl(ulu*) (4)
and J2(ul,u) < J2(uu 2) (5)
for all possible ul and u2.
3. Solution of the Open-Loop Problem
We seek a set of optimal controls ut and u*t defined over [O,N-1].
These controls are determined by each authority at the beginning of the
planning period, and are adhered to over the whole period.
3.1. Necessary Conditions
We write the two Hamiltonians:
1 (,1
X1 X )QX+ 1 
H2(xt'P2,t+l'Ult'U2t) = (xt- 2t) Q(x t-2t) 2 (t-t) 'R21 t- t)
+ (u2t-u2t)'R22(u2t-2t) + p,t+l(Axt+B1Ult+B 22 t+Czt) (7)
6 For a discussion of the Nash equilibrium in a differential game, see Starr
and Ho [21].
8We can apply the discrete-time minimum principle directly. 7 Letting x*,t
ut', ut' Pt, and P*t represent optimal values for the state, control,
and co-state vectors, we have as necessary conditions for authority 1:
+ - x a Pl -Ax* +BU + Bu* + Cz (8)t+l t ap t 1 t 2 2t t
P*t+l - Pa 1 - Ql(X -xlt) - A'Plt+l (9),t+l 1 t axt ,
The difference equations (8) and (9) are subject to the split boundary
conditions:
x8 = 5 (10)
and PN = Ql(X*XlN) (11)
Equation (11) is a result of the transversality condition. Finally, the
optimal control {u*t} must minimize the Hamiltonian:
Ult it
-1 0 , , (12)
or, ut =-RllBPl + (13)
Similarly, we have as necessary conditions for authority 2:
aH +u +Cz (14)
t+1 - a = Axt + BUt + B22t + Czt (14)
aH2 (15)
P2,t+l- P, xt = Q2 (x-x2t) - A'p
7 - See Pindyck [19], Chapter 2.
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(16)
O= 0
P2N= Q2(XN-X2N) (17)
(18)
and u2t = -R22B2,t+l 2t
3.2. Obtaining a Solution
We asmne that the optimal co-states p* and p* are of the form
1,t 2,t
P1,t = Kl,tx + gl,t
and P,t = K2,tx~ + g,t
(19)
(20)
We will soon see that these linear relationships indeed result in a solu-
tion. Now substitute (19) into (13) and (20) into (18):
u*t = -RllBl(Klt+iXt+ + glt+l ) lt
* = -1 B(K g
2ut -R22 2 2,t+lxt+l + g2,t+l ) +u2 t
(21)
(22)
We now substitute (19), (20), (21), and (22) into (8), (9), and (15):
x* - x* = Ax* - BRBKRllB1 lglt+l + B tt+l t t l 1,t t+l 2 11 ,t+1 B u1 t
- BRK-1 x -BG B R-1 + B Z2 222 2,t+ t+l 2 B 2B2g2,t+l 2+ B t+ t
P1,t+l 
-t = -Q(X-xlt) ' K xtX++gl, t+l
(23)
(24)
P2,t+- - - 2( t 2t) 2,t+lt+g2,t+l)
(25)
10
Now rearrange (23):
(I+B R'B'K + 'B'KllBKlt+l+B2R22B2K2,t+l) xt+ = (I+A) x*
- B R 1Bgl't+ - B2R-2Bg2,t+ Blt B2t + C (26)
We now substitute (19) into the left-hand side of (24) and (20) into the
left-hand side of (25), and rearrange:
I+A)'K,t+l t + Qt Kltx* -(I+A)'gl,t+l + gl + Qxlt (27)
(I+A)'K2,t+l+ l + Q2 - K2tx t -(I+A)'g 2,t+l + g2,t + Q2x2t (28)
Now define the n x n matrix Et:
Et MI + BR- ,'BK + B 1 B'K (29)I B1RllBKl,t 2R22 2 2,t+l
For now we will assume that Et is non-singular so that E t always exists.
Later we will see that this is indeed the case since K1,t and K2, t must always
be positive semi-definite. Now we can re-write (26) as:
* 1 (I+A) x E7 1 BR 1 B' B R 1 't+ = Et+(I+A) x - Et+l 1 11 Blgl,t +l 2 22 2,t+l
-1 -1 B1
t+lBlUlt Et+1B22t + Et+lCZt (30)
Now substitute (30) into (27):
-1 - 1 ,(I+A)'K [E+(I+A) x - Et+lB Rll glt+l
-1 -l+ Bu + E Bu +E CZ]
t+lB2R2 22B22,t+l Et+lBlUlt Et+lB2U2t + Et+lCZ t]
+ Qx* - Kltx* = -(I+A)'gl t+l + gl, t + Qlxlt (31)
which, after rearranging, yields
_ I___sl__ll______U__I·____________
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[Q- (I+A)'K ]++(I+AB+ x
[Q2+(I+A)'K 2,t+iEt+I+A)] 
- (I+A)'K Et+1t+l(BRllBglt++B2R22B22,t+l) + (+A)gl,t+l
,t+l t+l 1 11 1 t+ 2 2E (I+A)'K E- 1 +CZ Q K (32)
2,t+l t+l(BlUlt 22t+Cz) Q2x2t 2,t + g,t (33)
Equations (32) and (33) are results of the necessary conditions andg:
therefore must hold for any initial state C. As we will see, however, the
matrices Kit and K2t are determined only by the matrices A, B1, B2, C, Q1'i,t+l2t+l ]
-1 -1
Kt Q1 + I+A)'K t+lEt+(2g2,t+l+A) (34)
K2 t = I 2 + (I+A) 2,t+Eta+(I+A) (35)
12
-1 (B-1 , -1 +,
gl,t -(I+A)'Kl,t+lt+l(BRllBlgl t+l+B2R22B2g2,t+l )
-1
+ (I+A)gl,t+l + (I+A)'Kt+Et+l(Bit+B2 2t+C) Q (36)
-1 -1 -1
g2,t = -(I+A)'K2,t+lEt (B1R Bgl,t+l+B2R2B2g,t+l)
2,tl t+B2 1 11 t+ 2 2 2,t+)
+ (I+A)'g2 ,t+l + (I+A)'K2,t+lt+ l (Biit+B 2 2tCZ - (37)
From equations (11) and (19) we have
P*,N = Q1(-X1N) K1,NN + gl,N (38)
This must hold for any , so that
K1,N = Q1 (39)
(40)and gl,N = P1,N - K1 ,Nx = - Q1X1N
Similarly, from (17) and (20):
K2,N Q2
and g2,N = - Q2X 2N
(41)
(42)
Equations (34) and (35) are the joint Riccati equations and (36) and
(37) are the joint tracking equations for this open-loop decentralized
control problem. Together with equation (29) for Et and the boundary condi-
tions (39), (40), (41), and (42), they can be solved for Klt, K2t, git and
____1_1______  I1II H 
· I I_______
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g2t t 1,...,N. The optimal controls are determined by equations (21)
and (22). Substituting (30) for xt+ into (21) and (22), we obtain:
uit = R1I,t+lt+l[(I+A) x*-B R1 Bt lit 1--R;:-1 , t+ t 1 11 ,t+l
-BR'B'g +B +Bu +CZ ] -R'B~l' + (43)2 22 22g2,t++Bllt+B2u2t+t ] 1 RllB;gl, + t (4
and,
u2t = -R22B2K 2,t+lEt+l[(I+A) xt-B1Rl1 gl,t+l
-
1 B +B^ +B u+^ -1 ,42 -B22 g2,t+l+B 1 lt 2 2t t] 22B2g2,t+1 u2t (4)
Equations (43) and (44) determine the optimal controls ut and ut in
terms of the present optimal state x* and the solutions to the joint Riccati
t
equations and joint tracking equations. The solution to all of these equa-
tions require calculations of the inverted matrix E . We can show that the
matrix Et is indeed invertible (see equacion (29)) by demonstrating that all
of the Riccati matrices Kt and K2t are positive semi-definite.
Since Q1 and Q2 were specified to be positive semi-definite K1N and K2N
must be positive semi-definite (from equations (39) and (41)), and therefore
EN is positive definite. Now examine equations (34) and (35). Since KN,
K2N' Q1' and Q2 are all positive semi-definite, K1,N 1 and K2,N 1 must be
positive semi-definite. And similarly K,N2 , .. K1,1K and K 2 ,N-2 K, 11,1-2" 2 ,1
...,. __........... ..... I ---. ·-- -,,
.._,....-.---.--------;---- -··
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are all positive semi-definite. We can thus be certain that the matrix
Et is always non-singular and has an inverse.
t
3.3 Computing the Inverse Matrix Et
The expression for Et in equation (29) is an n x n matrix, and repeatedly
obtaining its inverse (for each time period t) will be computationally costly
if the dimensionality of the econometric model (i.e. the number of state vari-
ables) is at all large. Fortunately equation (29) can be transformed into an
expression that involves inverting a matrix of dimension r, where r = r + r2
is the total number of control variables and is likely to be considerably
smaller than n. We use the matrix identity
(I +ST') 1 = I - S(Ir+T'S)T' (45)
n n r
where I and I are identity matrices of order n and r respectively, and S
n r
and T are both n x r matrices. Now we partition S and T into two parts:
S = (S1,S2) and T = (T1,T2)
where S1 and T1 are n x r and S2 and T2 are n x r2, so that
(In+ST') = (In+SlT+S 2T) (46)
= R1 B'K and B' we haveNow letting S1 = B1, S2 = B2, T'1 Rl BKlt 2 R22B 2K2t, we have
-1 
Et = In - (B1,B 2) rn~~~ (47)
__ __ ---··--· ----- 
III
15
The matrix to be inverted is now of dimension r.
3.4. Summary of the Open-Loop Solution
In order to obtain the open-loop decentralized optimal control solution
we must begin with a specification of the econometric model in state-variable
form (i.e. the matrices A, B1, B2, and C), the trajectories of the exogenous
variables zt, the nominal (target) state and control trajectories for each
contr .ler (xlt' x2t', lt, and u2t), art the matrices of t- cost functionals
Q1' ,- Rll, and R22 (note that R12 and R21 are not needed for the solution,
and ia fact are irrelevant to the open-loop problem). A solution can then be
obtained by the following steps:
(1) Solve the joint Riccati equations (34) and (35) with boundary
conditions (39) and (41), together with equation (47) for E ,
backwards in time to obtain values for Klt, K2t, and E,
t - 1,...,N. Store the 2N n x n product matrices KltE;l and K2tEt
(2) Using the matrices calculated above, solve the joint tracking
equations (36) and (37) with boundary conditions (40) and (42)
backwards in time to obtain values for glt and g2t' t = 1,..- N.
Store the resulting 2N n-vectors.
(3) Compute the optimal control u from equation (43) and u 01,02,
from equation (44) using x = (. Then compute x* from equation
(1), the system equation. Now x can be used in equations (43)
and (44) to compute u,1 and u1' these can be used in equation
(1) to compute x, etc. This is continued until all of the ut
and u*t, t = 0,1,...,N-l, and all of x*, t = 1,...,N, have been
computed.
(4) The optimal costs J and J can be computed from equations (2)
and (3).
16
3.5. Interpretation of the Co-State Variables
Two sets of co-state variables exist for our problem, one set for each
controller. Their interpretation is not very different from that of the
centralized case, except that now each set of co-states determines a marginal
"cost-to-go" for a particular controller. Let J(xt,t) and J(xt,t) be the
costs to controllers 1 and 2 respectively that would accrue if each followed
an optimal strategy from time t to the terminal time N. Clearly, these costs
are a function of xt, the particular state that happens to exist at time t.
Since each controller has obtained his optimal strategy by applying the
minimum principle to his particular cost functional, we know that the co-states
at time t must be given by:
Pt= J*(xt't) (48)
and = Jx (xtt) (49)2t ax 2(x,,t)
t
Thus each co-state variable at time t is the marginal cost to one particular
controller resulting from a small change in the value of the corresponding
state variable. If at time t the state of the system were changed by a small
amount Axt and the system is controlled optimally (by each controller) until
the terminal time t N, then the additional cost to each controller is given
by
AJ*(xt,t) = ptA (50xt )1 it t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(0
and AJ*(xt,t) = P tAxt
__________________  naop*5-·.rra·*lllI ---------------------------
(51)
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Note that it is possible for these additional costs to be negative. A random
shock might change the state of the system in a way that would be to the ad-
vantage of one controller but at the expense of the other.
3.6. Generalization to More Than Two Controllers
It is easy to generalize our results to the case of k controllers.
Write the model in state-variable form as
(52)xt+l - t = Ax t + BlUlt + B2u 2t + ... + Bkukt + Czt
and the cost functional for controller j as
N-1
2 j ( N- X j N) + 2 (xt-xjt) Q(xt-xjt)
t-0
+ (u t- t)'Rj.(ult t) +... + (u j-ujt)'R (u ) +
+ (ukt-ukt)'Rjk(Ukt-Ukt)} (53)
It is straightforward to determine that the optimal open-loop strategies u,
u2t,...,ut, t 0,1,...,N-l, are found by solving the k joint Riccati equa-
tions
= Q +(+A)-1 (I+A)j t i (I A) Kj,t+lEt+l
with boundary conditions
KN = Qj
(j = 1,...,k) (54)
(j = 1,...,k) (55)
solving the k joint tracking equations
18
k
-1 k 
gjt= -(I+A)'Kjt+Et+ ( B R B'g ) + (I+A)'gt+l
=+ tl jj Jj jt+1j--1
k
+ (I+A)'K , t+lEt+l ( Z BjU Qjxjjt(I+A)'K +1t+ Bujt+Cz t) - t
21=1
(j = 1,...,k) (56)
with boundary conditions
gjN = -QjXjN' (j - ,...,k)
and using the solutions in the k optimal control equations
-1 ,BKjt+l -1
uJt = -RjB K,t+Et+[(I+A) x -
k
j=1
BjRjjBjgj,t+l
jj 212,±
k
+ Bjujt+CZt] - RBBJu, t+l ajt
=1jjJ t Ji +l jt'j3l j
Note that the matrix Et is now given by
k
Et = I + Z Bj 1 B'Kjj-1 = t
and its inverse can be calculated from
1 1 n
with S = (B1, B2,...,Bk)
and
T' =
RB'Klt11 1 t
--_----
RkBkk
Again, r is the total number of control variables.
(57)
(j = l, .... ,k) (58)
(59)
(60)
(61)
(62)
^1111-------11 -----1_-
_·1111111·-11-1-_·l.*l ..... -·-. -I_-
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4. Solution of the Closed-Loop Problem
If we assume that the two authorities are operating in a closed-loop
mode, then we must allow for them to adapt their policies (optimally) to
changes in the state of the economy. Note that they are not adapting to
the impact of random shocks on the economy, but rather each is adapting to
the evolving strategy of the other authority.8 Each authority will use a
control rule, designed at the beginning of the planning period and applied
to observations of the state of the economy, to continuously revise his
policy.
The solution of the closed-loop problem involves a modification of
the solution of the open-loop problem. The necessary conditions are the
same, except that now the difference equations describing the evolution of
the co-states must allow for changes in ult and u2t in response to changes
in xt. We replace equation (9), for example, with
l,t+l l,t axt - Ql(Xt-lt) -t Rll(Ut-lt)
- -- --*B'p* -B'p (63)kax R12(u2t-u2t) l,t+l t+l x 2,t+l
Since the Hamiltonians are the same as in the open-loop case, equations (13)
and (18) still hold, and if we again assume (and later show to be true)
that the co-state variables are related linearly to the state variables, then
equations (21) and (22) also hold. Differentiating (21) and (22) with
respect to xt, we obtain
8 - It should be pointed out, however, that under certainty equivalence the
closed-loop stochastic strategy is the same as the closed-loop deterministic
strategy. Thus the closed-loop control rules that we will derive are also
optimal in the case of additive serially uncorrelated errors.
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. -R71 B'K (64)
axt 1 1 1Kl,t+l
au2t -1
and ax = -RB222K2,t+1 (65)
Now substituting these derivatives into (63), we have
P t - P ,t = -Ql(Xt-xlt) + Kt+lBl(U t -Ult) + K,t+ B222 12 2tP,t+l tt 2 2 2 (u 2
-1, , + 1B2RBp
1,t+l K2, 1 22 B1,Rt+l (66)
And similarly, for p
2,t
P2,t P -4 2 t 2t 2,t+lB2(u - ut)+ K 1 21(U* lt -Ult
- AP5*, K1~lB-1+K B'p*,, + KBR + B R1B2'p*2 t+l ,t+1 1,1 1 2 2 222 2,t+l (67)
Equation (23) still holds, but equations (24) and (25) are now replaced by:
P t+l - P,t -Ql(X*-Xlt) - A'(Kl,t+lXslt+1 )
- K' BR 1R R B(K1 xB +g )2,t+l 2 22 12 222 2,t+lxt+l2,t+l
+ t+lB2R B(Kl t+lX + t+2,t+l 2 2 t+l+ll,t+l
Pt+l - P* = -Q2(X*-x2t) - A' (K2,t+lx+g2,t+l)
-K' BR -1 R-1 '(K
-1,t+l 1 11 21 11 1 t+(K t+l+l l,t+l
-1 )
+ K t+lB1R l B (K2 t+lX++g11t+lg2,t+l
(68)
(69)
and
__ ·_____·U_ml______m__llll_LIII
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These equations are simply the result of substituting equations (19), (20),
(21), and (22) into equations (66) and (67).
Now substitute equation (19) into the left-hand side of (68), (20) into
the left-hand side of (69), and rearrange:
(I+A)'K x* +K' BR R R 1B'K x -K' BR B'K,(I+A) t+l x*t+l K2,t+lB2R22R12 22 2,t+lxt+l K2,t+B 2 22 2l,t+l t+l
+ Q x* - K x* = -(I+A)'gl,t+l K2,t+lB2R2212 22 2g2,t+
+' BR B'g 1 + gt + Qx (70)2,t+l 2 222gl,t+1 lt lt
(I+A)'K x* +K' B R-1R R-1B'K x* -K' BRB'K 
+ Q x*t - K x -(Ig 2t+ l Kt+1 R l,t+lBRll2,t+lQ2x~ - K2tx = -(I+A)'g 2 - K
-1
1,t+lB1R 1 1Bg2,t+l + 2,t + Q2x2t (71)
We define Et as before in equation (29), so equation (30) still holds. Sub-
stituting (30) into (70) and rearranging,
[(I+A)'K +K +BR R BK2,t+
2-K t+l2B2;221tl]- Et+l t Q1 t
- [(I+A)'K t l+K2,t+2R22 1222 2,t+l
-1 ,
-K' B R B'Kl t+l] Et+i(BlRllBglg t+l 2 22 2 2,t+1-K2,t+l 2 22 Kl,t+l] -
( )gl,t+l 2,t+1 2 22 12 22 22g,t+1 2,t+l 2 22 2gl,t+1
l,t+l+K2,t+lB2R22R12R22B22 2,t+l
-K' tlB2R2BKl,t+l] Et+l(B1 lt+Bi t+ +CZ Qlt + ,t (72)2,t+l 2 22B2,t+lu 2 2t 1 t l,t +
22
Similarly, substituting (30) into (71) and rearranging,
[(I+)2,t+l 1 ,t+B 1RllR21R2llBKl,t+lKl t+lB1RllBK2,t+l] Et+l(I+Ax
+ Q x* - [(I+A)'K t+l+Kl,t+BRll 21RKlt+l
+ -+ B1 lR'B'Kt+l1
-KB R 1B1K2,t+1] Et+l (BRB22l,2t+l+B22B g2,t+l)1,;t+l 1 2, 1,  2R2 
+ (I+A)'g2,t+l K+lBR 21B 1 - K +B R
1Bgt+1,t+ 1 11 g2,t+l
+ [(I+A) 'K t++Kl t+lB1RllR21Rl BK l t+ l
-K ,t+B1 RB'K2,t+l] E t -=+g
- 1+1~~K t t+l(Bt+B1U2t+Cz- Q2x2t K2,tx + 2,t (73)
Since equations (72) and (73) must hold for all x, we can equate the coef-
ficients of the left-hand and right-hand sides. Doing so yields the fol-
lowing equations.
l Q+(IA E-1
Klt Q1 + (I+A)'Ki , t+ l (I+ A )
-1 -1 -1 -1
+ (KB R 1 K' B RB'K )2,t+lB2 22 12 22 2 2,t+l2,t+l 2 22 2 K,t+l Et+l(I+A)
K2t = Q2 + (I+A)'K 2 t+lE+l(I+A)
,t 2 1 Rll Ll
+ (KB-1 R RK-1 K -1 I+A)
l't+lB1 RR21RllB1Kl,t+l-K1,t+l B1 11B1K2,t+l) Et+l
(74)
(75)
_X(__I· _1_ ___1___1___1_____________
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gl, = -[(I+A)'K1 l t+l+K2,t+lB2R22R12 2K2,t+l
-, -lB2R;~ 1, t+l 22-1 -, -,
-K B t+ B2R22B2K lt +l] Et+(B1RlBgl,t+l+B2R22' g2,t+ 1)2,t+1 2 22 2 ,t+ E2R1 B 1R 1 2t
(I+A)'g1 + K2,t+lB2R22R1222B2g2,t+1 K2,t+lB2 2B 2l,t+ l
1,t+l 2,+lB2R22 12 22 2 2B' ,t+l
-K B R-'B'K, -1 +B+Cz) -2,t+1 2 22B2Kl, t+l(B1UltB22t+Z QExlt. (76)
, -1R 1 ,
2,t= -[(I+A) 'K2,t++Klt+lB1R R2 1RllBKlt+l
- 1 -1 RB
1,t+lB1R11B1K2,t+ 1] Et+l(BR 11 Blgt+l+B2R2 2 2 g2,t+l )
+ (I+A)'g ,t+ + K,t+lBlR2 1R llBlglt+l - K;,t+lB1R B g1 2,t+
, 12 B tl-t-1 - ,[(I+A)'K2,t+l+Kl, t+lB1RllR21 RllBKl
-K, B7R'B' 1 -1 B ^ 
-K,t+1RllBK 2,t+l] Et+l(Bult+B2u2t+Cz ) - (77)
The transversality conditions expressed by equations (11' . (17) still
hold, and therefore the boundary conditions in equations (39), (40), (41), and
(42) still hold. Equations (74) and (75) are the joint closed-loop Riccati
equations, and with boundary conditions (39) and (41) they can be solved to-
gether with equation (47) for Kt, K2t, and Et t = 1,...,N. Equa-
tions (76) and (77) are the joint closed-loop tracking equations, and to-
gether with boundary conditions (40) and (42) and the matrices Et Klt and
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K2 t, they can be solved for gt and g2t t 5 1,...,N. Once the matrices
Et , Klt, and K2t and vectors glt and g2t have been calculated, the optimal
closed-loop control rules are given by equations (43) and (44). For example,
the optimal controls u* and u* are computed from equations (43) and (44)
10 2,0
using x = i. Then x is computed using equation (1) and is used in equations
(43) and (44) to compute u 1 and u 1 ' etc.9
The co-state variables have the same interpretation as in the
open-loop problem; equations (48) and (49) still apply, so that each set of
co-states determines the marginal "cost-to-go" for a particular controller
resulting from a small change in the value of the state variables. Again,
it is possible for the co-states to be negative, as a random shock might
affect the system in a way that is advantageous to one controller.
5. Decentralized Stabilization Policies Using a Small Model
In order to examine the characteristics of decentralized stabilization
policies, we will apply our open-loop and closed-loop solutions to a small,
linear econometric model of the United States. Several experiments will be
performed, all of which are designed to demonstrate the economic effects of
conflict between monetary and fiscal objectives.
The model, which was constructed and used by this author in earlier
studies of optimal stabilization policies, is described in detail elsewhere
[19,20]. It contains nine behavioral equations together with a tax relation
and an income identity. Fiscal policy is provided for through exogenous govern-
ment expenditures G and a surtax T, and monetary policy through the money
supply M (currency plus demand deposits). GNP and its components are in real
terms, and total investment is disaggregated, so that separate equations explain
9 - If additive noise is present, then the xt are determined by measurement,
and used directly in equations (43) and 44) to determine the optimal
controls.
`'----``--I------------------_.
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consumption C, fixed nonresidential investment INR, residential invest-
ment IR, and change in inventories IIN. The remaining behavioral equations
explain short and long-term interest rates (R,RL), the price level P, the
unemployment rate UR, and the money wage rate W. The equations themselves
are listed in the Appendix. By adding new variables to replace variables
with lags greater than one period, the model can easily be expressed in the
state-variable form of equation (1).
All of the policy experiments pertain to a time horizon of twenty
quarters, beginning with the first quarter of 1957 and ending with the first
quarter of 1962. It is assumed that the nominal :ajectclies {xlt} and {x2t}
are the same for both the fiscal and monetary aut:uorities, and that differences
in objectives are expressed by the weighting matrices Q1 and Q2 Thus both
authorities are assumed to agree on what an "ideal" unemployment rate and
"ideal" rate of inflation are, but one authority might place greater importance
on unemployment while the other places greater importance on inflation. Nominal
trajectories are also specified for the control variables; it is assumed that
the fiscal authority (lt) desires a zero surtax and steady growth in government
expenditures and the monetary authority (u2t) desires steady growth of the money
supply. All of the nominal trajectories are shown in Table 1.10
5.1 Open-Loop Policies
The open-loop policy experiments are summarized in Table 2 in terms of
the diagonal coefficient values in the weighting matrices Q1 and Q2 (the off-
diagonal coefficients in the Q's and R's are all zero), In all of the experiments
the fiscal authority can manipulate only government spending (the coefficient in
10 The model, the planning horizon, an. ... ae nominal trajectories are the same as
those used in earlier work by the au.thor [19,20]. The results in this paper
can thus be compared with the analysis of the centralized case.
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Rll corresponding to T is made large enough so that that variable is
forced to follow its nominal path, i.e. the surtax is always zero).
Weights are assigned to deviations from the nominal paths of both govern-
ment spending (R11(G) = 30) and the money supply (R2 2(AM) = 150), so that
each authority has a trade-off between macroeconomic targets and the use
of its control variable to reach those targets. The fiscal authority,
for example, might wish to decrease the unemployment rate, but this must
be balanced against the (political) cos~ of very large increases in govern-
ment spending.ll Finally, R12 and R21 are both zero; these matrices do not
enter into the solution of the open-loop problem.
In the first set of experiments (Runs 1, 2, and 3) there are two
target variables, the price level and the unemployment rate. In Run 1 both
authorities have the same objectives, a two percent rate of inflation and
a two per cent unemployment rate, and both attach the same weights to these
objectives (Q1 = Q2) 12 The resulting optimal policy solution till provide
a frame of reference for Runs 2 and 3, since it corresponds to the conventional
case of centralized control. In Run 2 each authority has only one target vari-
able, the price level for the fiscal authority and the unemployment rate for the
monetary authority. The conflicting objectives are reversed in Run 3, with the
fiscal authority attempting to achieve-a low unemployment rate and the monetary
authority attempting to achieve a low rate of inflation. The optimal policy
results for Runs 1, 2, and 3 are shown graphically in Figures 1 to 9.
Note that the coefficient values in Q Q2' Rll and R 2 mus be interpreted in
terms of the relative magnitudes of te endogenous ana conr- .l variables. Percent
deviations from the nominal path of government spending a- enalized 20 times as
heavily as those for the money supply.
Both the price level and unemployment rate are weighted approximately equally in terms
of percent deviations from their nominal paths, and twice as heavily as government
spending. Of course an inflation rate of two percent and an unemployment rate of two
percent are mutually inconsistent targets, even in this case where both authorities
agree on objectives.
---~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I
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Table 2
OPEN-LOOP POLICY EXPERIMENTS
(In all cases, R12 =R2 1=0, Rll(TO)=X105 , Rll(G)=30, and R22(AM)=150.)
C INR IR IIN R RL P UR W YD
RUN 1 Q 0 0 0 0 0 0 120 4xlO 0 0
(Centralized Q2: 0 0 0 0 0 0 120 4x10 0 0
-Case)_
RUN 2 Q 0 0 0 0 0 0 120 0 0 0
Q2: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4X10 O0
RUN 3 Q10: 0 0 0 0 0 0 4x10 0 0
Q2 : 0 0 0 0 0 0 120 0 0 0
RUN 4 Q 0 0 600 0 0 0 120 4X10 0 0
(Centralized 7
Case) 2
RUN 5 Q1 0 0 600 0 0 0 120 4x107 0 0
7
Q2U: 0 0 0 0 0 0 120 4x10 0 0
RUN 6 Q 0 0 0 0 0 0 120 4x107 0 0
Q2 : 0 0 600 0 0 0 120 4x10 0 0
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Observe that in Run 1 the optimal policy calls for both government
spending and the quarterly change in the money supply to be above their
nominal paths throughout the planning period.13 The result is growth in
disposable income of about 5% per year, and an unemployment rate of between
3 1/2 and 3 percent. The policy is less effective in maintaining a slow
rate of growth in prices than in maintaining a low unemployment rate; the
rate of inflation is about 5% during most of the planning period. This is
characteristic of the model's wage-price dynamics; it is considerably easier
to reduce the unemployment rate than it is to reduce the inflation rate,
so that when both are weighted equally in the cost functionals the optimal
policy favors the unemployment rate. Another characteristic of the model
is that the government spending multiplier is much larger than that for the
money supply. Although deviations from the nominal path for government spend-
ing are penalized twenty times as heavily as those for the money supply,
government spending provides much of the increase in disposable income (the
interest rates rise above their nominal paths, so that residential investment
grows only during the first eight quarters).l4
In Run 2 the fiscal authority initially sets government spending $13 billion
below its nominal value, and keeps government spending below the nominal path
13 When interpreting the results it is important to keep in mind that the cost
functionals accumulate penalities only over a finite time period - namely,
twenty quarters. This will influence the optimal paths for some variables
during the last few quarters of the planning period. Changes in the money
supply, for example, affect the short-term interest rate immediately, but at
least two quarters must apse before there is any impact on residential inves-
ment and hence GNP. Therefore, if the cost functional J2 dons not penalize
directly for interest rate deviations from the nominal, t½i optimal quarterly
change in the money supply will always be equal to the nominal value ($1,4 billion)
during the last two quarters of the planning period.
14 The unbalanced weights for government spending and the money supply in
Rll and R22 are chosen to allow for more monetary action in the solutions.
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until the end of the planning period. This results in an immediate drop
in disposable income (and an increase in the unemployment rate to 8%),
and a rate of inflation that is below 3% for the first two years. As
expected the monetary authority increases the money supply extremely
rapidly, particularly during the beginning of the planning period (rapid
increases in the money supply are less "cost-effective" later because of
the lag in monetary policy). 15 The impact on aggregate demand, however,
occurs after several periods (as can be seen from residential and nonresiden-
tial investment and disposable income), so that the unemployment rate falls
below 5% only after six quarters.
In Run 3 the fiscal authority simply maintains a level of government
spending that is well above the nominal path throughout the planning period.
Monetary policy is restrictive, with the money supply contracting during the
first year of the planning period. The higher interest rates do not, however,
compensate for the increased government spending, so that disposable income
is high throughout the period. The unemployment rate remains below 3%, and
the rate of inflation stays at about 6%. The fiscal authority is far more
effective in reaching its objective than is the monetary authority, but this
is partly due to the fact that a low unemployment rate is easier to achieve
(in the model) than a low rate of inflation. The money supply is closer to
its nominal path in Run 3 than it is in Run 2 because deviations from the
nominal path are not as "cost-effective" when the price level is the target
variable (observe also that government spending is closer to its nominal path
in Run 2 than it is in Run 3).
15 Note that the short-term interest becomes negative at the beginning of the
planning period. This is a result of the linearity of the model.
_____I 
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A comparison of Runs 2 and 3 shows that overall the fiscal authority
has more control over the economy than does the monetary authority. Ob-
serve in Figures 6 and 7 that both the unemployment rate and the price
level are closer to their nominal paths when they are the target of the
fiscal authority than when they are the target of the monetary authority.
This difference is largely due to the lag in monetary policy. As we will
see, this lag gives the fiscal authority an even greater advantage in the
closed-loop case. In Runs 4, 5, and 6 residential investment is added as
a third target variable (the performance of the housing market is often an
objective of macroeconomic policy, both fiscal and monetary). This target
variable is worth considering because it is highly dependent on interest
rates, and therefore more influenced by monetary policy. The optimal
policy results are shown in Figures 10 to 16.
Run 4 corresponds to the case of centralized control in that there
is no conflict between fiscal and monetary objectives. The target variables
and their weightings in Q1 and Q2 are the same as in Run 1, except that now
residential investment is also assigned a weight in both matrices such that
percent deviations from its nominal path are penalized twice as heavily as
those for the price level and the unemployment rate. Observe that the optimal
trajectory for government spending is close to that of Run 1, and that the
increase in residential investment is achieved largely through a rapid expan-
sion of the money supply. The rate of growth of the money supply is high to
begin with, and increases, reaching a peak towards the end of the fourth year
(the drop in the fifty year is due to the finite planning horizon and the lag
between monetary expansion and growth in residential investment). The result
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is that residential investment grows much more rapidly than was the
case in Run 1. In addition, the unemployment rate is very low,
falling from 3 1/2 percent to little more than 2 percent, while the
rate of inflation is approximately 5 1/2 percent throughout the planning
period (again it is easier to achieve a low unemployment rate than a
low rate of inflation).
In Runs 5 and 6 both authorities still have the unemployment rate
and the price level as targets, but there is a conflict over residential
investment. In Run 5 residential investment is an additional target for
the fiscal authority (but not the monetary authority), and in Run 6 it is
an additional target for the monetary authority. Observe that the results
for Run 6 are almost identical to those for Run 4. The optimal policy
for Run 4 calls for a division of objectives, with government spending
used to achieve a low unemployment rate and the money supply used to
reduce the interest rate so that residential investment can grow. In
Run 6 the fiscal authority has, in effect, the same objectives, and the
monetary authority can manipulate the money supply in roughly the same way.
In Run 5 the behaviour of the fiscal authority is close to what it
was in Runs 4 and 6. The only way that the fiscal authority can reduce
interest rates is by reducing government spending and thus total income
so that the demand for money falls. The drop in income, however, would
have a negative impact on residential investment, canceling part of the
effect of the lower interest rate. By itself, then, the fiscal authority
has only limited control over residential investment, and its best policy
is to pursue its unemployment and inflation objectives. (The fiscal
III
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authority also knows that some moderation of interest rates will
occur in any case as a result of the optimal policy of the monetary
authority.) Although the monetary authority does not have residential
investment as a target, the only way that it can pursue its unemployment
objective is through monetary expansion. Thus the money supply in Run 5
grows rapidly, though not as rapidly as in Runs 4 and 6.
5.2 Closed-loop Policies
In the closed-loop mode each authority will continually revise
its policy during the planning period to adapt to the evolving stragegy
of the other authority (and each authority will design and revise its
own strategy knowing that the other authority will respond to it as time
goes on). One would expect that the closed-loop mode would favor the
fiscal authority, since the time lag between changes in government spending
and changes in GNP is smaller than that for the money supply, Since the
fiscal response to changes in monetary policy is faster than the monetary
response to changes in fiscal policy, the fiscal authority should gain more
of an advantage from a closed-loop strategy.
Note that the matrices R12 and R21 appear in the closed-loop solution.
If policies can be revised then it is possible for one authority to influence
the policy of the other. In particular, each authority can (if it desires)
act to force the other authority to move its policy variables closer to (or
farther from) the nominal paths.
Two closed-loop policy experiments are performed using the solution
algorithm derived in Section 4. The first (Run 2A) is a repetition of Run 2,
but in the closed-loop mode, and the results permit a direct comparison
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between open and closed-loop behavior. The second experiment (Run 2B)
is the same as.the first except that a value of 300 is assigned to the
coefficient in R2 1 corresponding to government spending. This means
that the monetary authority (in addition to desiring a low unemployment
rate) would like government spending to be close to its nominal path.'6
(While the economic relevance of this experiment is questionable, it helps
to illustrate the nature of the closed-loop solution.) The closed-loop
policy results are shown in Figures 17 to 25, together with the open-loop
results from Run 2.
Let us first examine Run 2A (R1 2=R2 1=0). As can be seen in the
figures, the closed-loop mode indeed favors the fiscal authority. The
optimal trajectory for the price level (the fiscal target) rises less
rapidly in the closed-loop case than in the open-loop case, while the
unemployment rate (the monetary target) is higher throughout the planning
period. What is interesting is that this is a result not of a shift in
fiscal policy, but a shift in monetary policy. The closed-loop and open-
loop trajectories for government spending differ only slightly, with the
closed-loop trajectory lower than the open-loop trajectory during the
first four quarters, and higher during the remainder of the period. The
closed-loop money supply, on the other hand, grows much less rapidly than
the open-loop money supply during the first three years, As a result,
interest rates are higher, and investment and income are lower.
To see why this smaller expansion of the money supply is optimal for
the monetary authority, consider how each authority would react to policies
of the other. The fiscal authority would react to a large increase in the
16 Percent deviations for government spending are weighted five times as heavily
as those for the unemployment rate in the monetary authority's cost functional.
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money supply by a decrease in government spending. The fiscal contrac-
tion, however, could occur several periods after the monetary expansion
and still cancel out any expansion in the GNP. Both authorities would
accumulate an additional cost by having their policy variables deviate
farther from the nominal paths, but the cost would be lower for the fiscal
authority because of the delay before e beginning of the fiscal contrac-
tion. Extreme olicies are thus more wtly to the monetary authority
than the fiscal :thority (note that the fiscal authority begins ;- a
level of govern.eat spending that is below that of the openr-loop case).
As a result, the optimal closed-loop strategy for the monetary authority
is to moderate its initial increases in the money supply,
Now let us turn to Run 2B, for which R2 1(G) 8 30. The optimal
strategy for the monetary authority is now quite different, with the
quarterly change in the money supply initially small but rapidly increasing,
The optimal fiscal policy, given this monetary policy, calls -r government
spending to begin at a higher level but rise less rapidly than. it did before.
The result is that government spending is closer to its nominal path through-
out the planning period, and the price level is lower, so that the fiscal
authority is clearly better off. The unemployment rate is higher during
most of the planning period, but this added cost for the monetary authority
is more than offset by the gains from the higher level of government spending
and the smaller increases in the money supply. (Although the increase in
government spending is small, that variable is weighted heavily in the cost
functional of the monetar- authority.)
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6. Concluding Remarks
Despite the simplicity of the econometric model used in the
experiments, the results of the last section do demonstrate some of
the implications of conflict in the objectives of stabilization policy.
We found, for example, that when the conflict is between unemployment
and inflation, the fiscal objectives will be more nearly met. This is
particularly the case in the closed-loop mode, and is a result of the
longer lag inherent in monetary policy. Certain targets, however, can
be reached only by a particular authority; we saw that rapid increases
in residential investment will not be achieved unless it is an objective
shared by the monetary authority or is an indirect result of some other
monetary objective (as in Run 2). Finally, the results seem to indicate
that the "sub-optimality" resulting from a conflict situation is severe
only in the first four to six quarters of the planning period. After
six quarters a "compromise" behavior occurs where neither authority is
as close to its targets as it would be in a cooperative situation, but
there are no wide deviations from targets as a result of time-phasing
problems arising from the conflict. In Run 2, for example, the unemploy-
ment rate goes above 8 percent during the first year of the planning period
(as a result of the monetary lag), but then settles to within a range of
four to five percent during the remaining four years.
Of course our results are subject to the limitations of the model,
including the limitation of linearity. Unfortunately, computational solu-
tions to differential games are extremely difficult to obtain for non-linear
models (nonlinearities are far more difficult to handle than is the case in
____ I ----·C·BRePII
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a conventional centralized optimal control problem). The solution
algorithms presented in this paper can, however, be applied to other
linear or linearized models that are larger (and perhaps more accept-
able). Here we have only tried to show that decentralized optimal
control solutions can provide another tool for the analysis of macro-
economic policy.
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APPENDIX
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
The equations of the model are listed below. All of the behavioral
equations were estimated over the period 1955-I to 1967-IV, using two-
stage least squaresin combination with a Hildreth-Lu autoregressive
correction. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis beneath each
estimated coefficient. Also shown are the R 2 , the standard error of the
regression (SER), the F statistic, the Durbin-Watson (DW), and the value
of p used in the autoregressive transformation.
GNP:
GNP = C + INR + IR + IIN + G
Disposable Income, YD:
YD .85GNP - T0
Consumption C:
C = .4152YD - .2819YD_l + 8.1743W 1 -2.3676AP + .7596(
(.0502) (.0586) (4.83) (1.06) (.0734
R = .9991, SER 1.594, F - 10,280, DW -
Non-residential Investment. INR:
INR = .1569AYD + .0443AYD_3 - 1.3563ARL_5 + .3397AINR 1
(.0221) (.0225) (0.863) (.0910)
-.0042(INR 1 + INR 2 ).
(.0017)
R = .718, SER - .744, F = 29.3, DW - 1.
I-1 + 5.2998.
i) (2.44) (A3)
1.95, p = -.400
(A.4)
98, p -.335
Residential Investment, IR:
IR =.0127YD -.550(R2 + R3) + .603IR 1 + 6.65.
(.0023) (.0886) (.0470) (1.140)
2
R = .992, SER = .582, F = 184.9, DW = 1.64, p = .700.
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Inventory Investment, IIN:
IIN = .0113YD +.4647A2YT - .6002A2C + .4219IIN_1 - 2.4615.
(.0054) (.0782) (.1617) (.0916) (2.219)
2R = .740) SER = 2.228, F = 33.5, DW - 2.28,
(A.6)
p .400.
Short-term Interest Rate, R:
R - .0071YD + .0233AYD - .1648AM + .4791AP + .374R_1- 1,4734.
(.0019) (.0074) (.0719) (.193) (.1175) (.537)
2
R = 883, SER = .336, F = 68.2, DW - 1.90, p = .400.
Long-term Interest Rate, RL:
RL = .0598R + .0055A 2YD + .8715RL + .3126.2 -1
(.0428) (.0027) (.0704) (.1931)
2
R .941, SER = .1358, F 292, DW - 1.97,
(A.8)
p - .250.
Price Level, P:"
P = 6.281W_1 + .0195(YD_l - YDP_1) - .03281IN 2 - .0156YD
(.814) (.0046) (.0093) (.0050)
+ .8040P + 14.552.
(.0788) (2.220)
2
R = .984, SER = .195, F = 710.3, DW = 2.47,
(A.9)
p .500.
Unemployment Rate, UR:
UR = -.00043AYD - .00032AYD_1 + .0024W_1 - .00014(YD_1-YDP_1)
(.00009) (.00008) (.00093) (.00007)
+ .8047UR_ 1 + .0065.
(.0904) (.004.1)
2
R = .953, SER = .0023, F = 185.5,
Money Wage Rate, W:
(A.10)
DW = 1.11, p a .050.
(A.1)W = .0105P_3 + .0011YD_1 + .0012AYD - .8277UR 4 + .6269W 1 -.6850.
(.0031) (.0003) (.0004) (.2441) (.1062) (.2045)
2R . 9992, SER = .0117, F = 11,940, DW = 1.87, p = .0200.
A2YD =YD - YD2 = AYD YD + D1.
2 The exogenous variable YDP represents potential disposable income, It is
based on a potential GNP trend line.
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